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DAMAGES AS RECONCILIATION
W Jonathan Cardi*
One of tort law's chief aims is to repair the loss wrongfully suffered by
one party at the hands of another. Yet the mechanism of repair-forced
transfer of money-often leaves both parties dissatisfied. This Article
explores the possibility of a tort system that includes reconciliation as
one of its goals and considers the role of court-ordered damages in
such a system. The Article suggests that direct efforts by courts to
encourage reconciliation might ultimately further the goals of tort law,
as well as produce the collateral effects of reducing administrative
costs, insurance premiums, and damage verdicts.
I have learnt the true practice of law. I had learnt to find
out the better side of human nature and to enter men's
hearts. I realised that the true function of a lawyer was to
unite parties riven asunder. The lesson was so indelibly
burnt into me that a large part of my time during the twenty
years of my practice as a lawyer was occupied in bringing
about private compromises of hundreds of cases. I lost
nothing thereby-not even money, certainly not my soul.
-Gandhi'
I. INTRODUCTION
As a young lawyer practicing in South Africa, Gandhi came to
understand his role as that of a peacemaker. In his view, a lawyer's
work is to reconcile parties to one another, to help each see the
other's point of view, to guide the parties toward compromise, and
ideally to have them part as friends.2 Gandhi was apparently quite
successful at facilitating reconciliation, despite working within a
* Dorothy Salmon Chair and Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. The
author would like to thank David Partlett, Russ Weaver, and the other participants of the Emory
Remedies Roundtable for their valuable contributions to this Article.
1. MOHANDAS GANDHI, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 112 (1983).
2. THOMAS WEBER, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND GANDHIAN ETHICS 3 (1991).
http://www.mkgandhi.org/conflict-reso/chapO4.htm.
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British-style adversarial legal system and no doubt despite the fact
that a majority of his colleagues at bar did not share his approach.
Today, in America, Gandhi's notion of legal representation
seems quaint. Our legal system does not seek reconciliation between
parties to a lawsuit. Rather, it seems geared to achieve exactly the
opposite. Our code of ethics counsels "zealous" advocacy above all
else,3 and truth and justice are reached not via compromise but
through the clash of opposing arguments.' Indeed, one might
reasonably wonder whether parties to an American tort suit would
welcome reconciliation at all. Ours is a fiercely individualistic
society, and increasingly so. Many of us do not know or care to
know our neighbors, let alone the face at the other end of a fender
bender. Our lives are built around competition and a rights-based
entitlement philosophy5 that leads us more likely to cite Kant (if
metaphorically) than to focus on amicable settlement and the
restoration of social balance.
Our legal system-and this Article focuses specifically on the
tort system--does offer some concessions toward reconciliation.
Judges often postpone trial proceedings in light of potentially fruitful
settlement negotiations. Some courts also require (by statute or local
rule) supervised mediation before setting a trial date.' But the core
of tort law-tort doctrine, its corresponding enforcement
mechanisms, and its underlying goals-does not embrace
reconciliation as a primary end.' Rather, tort law is typically
3. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980) ("A lawyer should
represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law."); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 1 (1983) ("The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest
benefit of the client's cause .... The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits
within which an advocate may proceed.").
4. Dean Robert Gilbert Johnston & Sara Lufrano, The Adversary System as a Means of
Seeking Truth and Justice, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 147, 147 (2002).
5. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 150-95 (1977).
6. See KATHRYN VAN WEZEL STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 859 (2000) ("Several states, including Texas, Florida, and California,
require parties to engage in mandatory mediation before they can obtain a trial in certain types of
civil cases."); see also Marilyn Peterson Armour & Mark S. Umbreit, The Paradox of
Forgiveness in Restorative Justice, in HANDBOOK OF FORGIVENESS 492 (2005) (explaining that
in the criminal context, Victim Offender Mediation (VOM) programs, Victim Offender
Reconciliation Programs (VORP), and Victim Offender Mediated Dialogue (VOMD) are
increasingly used as a means of voluntary restorative justice).
7. See DAVID G. AUGSBURGER, CONFLICT MEDIATION ACROSS CULTURES 193 (1992)
(asserting that litigation is "an alienating and estranging foray into a public forum that adjudicates
but does not mediate [or reconcile], concludes but does not connect, and coerces but does not
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associated with a mix of corrective justice and instrumental goals.
According to some, tort law is primarily (or even exclusively)
concerned with providing legal enforcement of an individual's moral
obligation to repair a loss wrongfully inflicted on another.8 This
obligation is not typically understood to encompass a duty to
reconcile. To others, tort law is merely a tool used by the state to
achieve goals such as the efficient spreading of loss, risk reduction,
or the regulation of industrial versus individual interests.9 Although
reconciliation might not be conceptually inconsistent with these
traditional aims,1" it is generally regarded as a personal rather than a
legal matter, or at least as outside the pragmatic reach of the law.
Nonetheless, Gandhi's approach to law might deliver to tort
victims and wrongdoers something that is missing from the current
order-a richer sense of justice, wholeness, and closure that many
participants report lacking at the close of legal proceedings." In
addition, reconciliation might serve as the key to a number of
confounding correlative problems. Perhaps tort law's failure to
embrace reconciliation explains its insufficient ability to deter risky
behavior. 2  Perhaps the corresponding refusal by parties to
compromise results in higher administrative costs and damage
verdicts, and consequently in higher insurance premiums. 3 Perhaps
resolve the dispute or the pain of the disputants"); see also Donna L. Pavlick, Apology and
Mediation: The Horse and Carriage of the Twenty-First Century, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
829, 856 (2003) ("Courts, however, are not concerned with emotional harmony" but with
"'adjudicating rights, rather than on repairing relationships .... .' (quoting Jonathan Cohen,
Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1009, 1042 (1999))).
8. See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 570 (2003).
9. See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals
of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REv. 163, 180-201 (2004) (describing commonly ascribed tort goals).
10. See infra Part III and accompanying notes.
11. See generally E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants'
Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 953 (1990)
(reporting on an empirical study of tort litigants evaluating their experiences with the courts and
their satisfaction with the outcome of their cases).
12. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does
Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377 (1994) (questioning the ability of tort law to deter
dangerous conduct).
13. Cf Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture
in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 461, 487-88 (1986) (comparing Japanese
and American cultural approaches to certain injuries-including defamation, insult, degradation,
and the loss of status-and asserting that apologies often correspond with lower damages
awards). I do not mean to imply that liability insurance premiums are high exclusively or even
primarily due to exaggerated tort verdicts. In fact, the cause of spikes in insurance premiums
remains unclear. See, e.g., Matthew Parrott, Is Compulsory Court-Annexed Medical Malpractice
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tort participants' failures at self-reliance lead to a problematic
overreliance on experts.' 4  And perhaps our failure as lawyers to
embrace Gandhi's notion of the law is what leads the public to its
general loathing of lawyers and its dissatisfaction with the tort
system.
This Article explores the possibility of a tort system that
includes reconciliation as one of its goals and considers the role of
court-ordered damages in such a system. Part II defines the scope of
reconciliation advocated in this Article and considers the role of
reparation in reconciliation. Part III notes reconciliation's central
part in mediation and examines the reasons underlying the divergent
aims of mediation and litigation. Part IV discusses the possibility of
state-encouraged reconciliation and then proposes some ideas for
reform in this regard.
II. THE ROLE OF REPARATION IN
RECONCILIATION (AND VICE VERSA)
Several years ago, a mother accompanied her son and his Boy
Scout troop to a shooting range for a lesson in firearms safety and
marksmanship. While an instructor at the range demonstrated the
workings of his pistol with the boy, the gun discharged, killing the
boy instantly before his mother's very eyes. The boy's parents did
not seek criminal prosecution, nor did they sue the instructor for
negligence. Instead, on the following day, the boy's parents forgave
the remorseful instructor and invited him to sit at their side during
the boy's funeral. They explained that although the death of their
son was nearly unbearable, the prospect of harboring anger and
resentment toward another in relation to that death was only more
SO.
15
Arbitration Constitutional? How the Debate Reflects a Trend Towards Compulsion in Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2685, 2708 (2007) (suggesting that although the true
cause of the medical malpractice insurance crisis is unclear, likely causes include "cyclical
pricing and investment practices of insurance companies" (citing Heather Brann, Utah 's Medical
Malpractice Prelitigation Panel: Exploring State Constitutional Arguments Against a Nonbinding
Inadmissible Procedure, 2000 UTAH L. REv. 359, 359 (footnote omitted) (2000))). If tort
verdicts are higher than they might otherwise be, however, such a difference seems likely to
translate in some fashion into higher insurance premiums.
14. See WEBER, supra note 2, at 4.
15. This story was related to the author by a friend of the boy's family.
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This astonishing story seems to embody the kind of
reconciliation that Gandhi contemplated when he spoke of a desire to
bring about a reunification or friendship between parties "riven
asunder" by the events that gave rise to legal action.'6 One definition
of reconcile in Webster's Dictionary mirrors at least an aspect of
Gandhi's sentiment: "to win over to friendliness; cause to become
amicable."' 7 This is not the sense in which the term reconciliation is
used in this Article, however. It is not the function of the state to
concern itself with friendship and amicability. Among other things,
such aims would likely exceed the state's police power and offend
basic norms of liberty and privacy.
Nonetheless, the reconciliation sought by the Boy Scout's
parents hints at something that is within the reach of the law. The
most immediate goal of a tort remedy is to make the victim whole, to
return the victim as near as possible to his or her pre-tort condition."8
Tort victims are often harmed physically, emotionally, and
financially, and each of these harms is, with some constraints,
compensable in damages. But a tort victim is also harmed in a social
sense. 9 Upon the Boy Scout's death, one imagines that his parents
felt betrayed by the firearms instructor and, as a result of that
betrayal, felt that their sense of place and safety within the social
fabric was shaken. Each of us, when subject to wrongdoing, feels a
schism with the offending person and often with the greater
community. Tort theorists account for this social harm as one of
several justifications for a state-imposed remedy-that is, tort as a
form of personal and social retribution,2" or as a corrective return to
the pre-tort equilibrium between tortfeasor and victim.2' Social harm
16. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
17. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1612 (Barnes & Noble Books,
1996).
18. Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV.
772, 775 (1985).
19. See, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, GETTING EVEN, FORGIVENESS AND ITS LIMITS 35 (2003)
("When I am wronged by another, a great part of the injury ... is the insulting or degrading
message that has been given to me by the wrongdoer: the message that I am less worthy than he
is, so unworthy that he may use me merely as a means or object in service to his desires and
projects.").
20. See generally Ronen Perry, The Role of Retributive Justice in the Common Law of Torts:
A Descriptive Theory, 73 TENN. L. REV. 177 (2006) (discussing the role of retributive justice in
tort law).
21. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 56-83 (1995) (describing
Aristotle's original notions of "corrective justice").
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is not compensable as a sum of damages, however, nor is it
addressed by any other remedy.22 Even if damages were available
for social harm, money is particularly unsuited for such repair.
Reconciliation is a way of repairing such injury, a means of making
the tort victim whole.
The term reconcile has evolved from the Latin word
reconciliare, which means "to make good again" or "repair.' '24  In
addition to the definition previously mentioned, Webster's defines
the modem term as "to cause (a person) to accept or be resigned to
something not desired," "to compose or settle," and "to bring into
agreement or harmony. "25 These definitions begin to capture the
sense in which this Article considers reconciliation. Ultimately,
reconciliation consists of letting go of the negative emotions
associated with another-emotions such as pain, anger, resentment,
and vindictiveness. More immediately, reconciliation is a reparation
of the social rift created by wrongful behavior, a correction of the
marred social equilibrium. It redresses both the harm felt by the tort
victim and the guilt, remorse, and alienation often felt by the
tortfeasor. 26  Reconciliation is, in many cases, a return of each party
to his or her pre-tort state of mind with regard to the other and to
society generally.
22. Although a jury might take social harm into account when assigning an award for
emotional damages, most jury instructions explain emotional damages in terms of pain and
suffering, psychological illness, or general grief for corporeal loss. See, e.g., Stephen D.
Sugarman, A Comparative Law Look at Pain and Suffering Awards, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 399, 399
(2006) (explaining that the typical emotional harm award is "meant to compensate for things like
the physical pain and suffering that goes along with a physical trauma, the emotional harm that
can come from an injury to one's self or a loved one, the disappointment or embarrassment
arising from one's changed appearance or altered abilities to engage in pleasurable activities and
favorite pastimes as a result of an injury, the harm to one's dignity or one's health from being
wrongly injured by another, and so on"). Of course, social harm of a different type is
compensable-the harm to reputation caused by defamation and the analogous harms inherent in
invasion-of-privacy torts. Ingber, supra note 18, at 819.
23. Cf Daniel Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, 83 JUDICATURE 180, 182 (2000)
("In a limited sense, damages for tangible loss undo the harm; damages for intangible loss cannot
make a similar claim.").
24. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 1612.
25. Id.
26. Cf Armour & Umbreit, supra note 6, at 492 ("[The related concept of forgiveness] can
release the victim from the negative power of the crime, raise the offender back to the status of a
human being, facilitate the offender's reintegration into the community, restore the victim's peace
of mind, and potentially contribute to the victim's mental and physical health." (citations
omitted)).
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In fleshing out this concept further, it is helpful to consider what
reconciliation is not. To reconcile is not to deny, forget, or excuse a
wrongdoer's conduct or the fact that harm occurred. Reconciliation
also does not imply or require any release from accountability. In
fact, as noted below, reconciliation is typically not possible without
acceptance of responsibility by the wrongdoer.27  Nor does
reconciliation, as it is conceived in this Article, require the
resumption of trust or any personal relationship with the other party
going forward. This latter understanding departs from common
intuitions and many psychological explanations of the concept.28
Reconciliation in the tort context, however, must be unique. Its
focus must be to repair social harm, not to foster positive relations.
Because the parties to a tort suit typically did not know one another
ex ante, reconciliation might simply result in the resumption of the
parties' relationship as fellow citizens going their separate ways.29
Where parties did have a preexisting relationship, reconciliation
might lead to a return to closer ties, but it need not. Reconciled
parties might instead settle for an amicable, but not intimate,
association or no association at all.30
Reconciliation, as articulated in this Article, is similar to
forgiveness, a term also frequently used to refer to a letting go of the
negative emotions of anger and vindictiveness parties may feel
toward one another. 31 The concepts are not identical, however.
27. See infra Part II.D.
28. See, e.g., Caryl E. Rusbult et al., Forgiveness and Relational Repair, in HANDBOOK OF
FORGIVENESS, supra note 6, at 187 ("[RIeconciliation, [is] defined as the resumption of
pretransgression relationship status. . . . [T]he two most important considerations in
understanding reconciliation center on restoring commitment ... and trust . ) (emphasis in
original).
29. It is interesting to note that in the restorative justice context, one study showed that 18
percent of participants were willing (or had already begun) to have additional social contact with
one another. Armour & Umbreit, supra note 6, at 496.
30. One might argue that such a "reconciliation" would not constitute a complete repair of
the harm done by the tort. Even if this is true, such is the point at which the law's desire to
compensate must reach its limit. This author would counter, however, that one might experience
a healing of social harm without a return to the trust, admiration, and special bond that is
friendship.
31. See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 19, at 13 (defining forgiveness in this way); Michelle
Cardi et al., Self-Esteem Moderates the Response to Forgiveness Instructions Among Women with
a History of Victimization, 41 J. PERSONALITY REs. 804, 805 (2007). The precise meaning of
forgiveness is a matter of much debate in psychological and philosophical literature. See, e.g.,
Julie Juola Exline et al., Forgiveness and Justice: A Research Agenda for Social and Personality
Psychology, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 337, 338-40 (2003). Nonetheless, most
psychologists concur that "forgiveness involves a conscious decision-while acknowledging the
Fall 2008]
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Forgiveness is primarily an internal state, often closely associated
with one's moral virtues.32 Although reconciliation often follows the
adoption of a certain internal state, its focus is predominantly social.
Thus, one might achieve some level of reconciliation with another in
the absence of forgiveness." One might also forgive without
engaging in the social act of reconciliation.
3 4
Several elements provide the groundwork for reconciliation of
the type contemplated here. Although these elements are not in all
cases prerequisites to reconciliation, they are likely found where
parties have reconciled. And even with the presence of each of these
elements, reconciliation might not take place. Ultimately,
reconciliation is the product of self-determination and of effective
communication between parties. Tort law cannot impose such a
result; it can only influence the conditions from which reconciliation
might spring. These conditions are as follows:
A. Resolution of the Dispute
In the legal context, some dispute resolution is necessary before
reconciliation is possible. Resolution may take the form of
compromise and settlement, or it may consist of a trial verdict. The
importance of this element lies in its finality and its effect as social
validation of the victim's claim.
B. Apology
In order for reconciliation to occur, the wrongdoer typically
must accept responsibility for the wrongful act and the resulting
seriousness of the wrong-to release or forego bitterness and vengeance." Id. at 339 (citation
omitted).
32. MURPHY, supra note 19, at 13; see Erin Ann O'Hara & Douglas Yam, On Apology and
Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121, 1132 (2002) ("Forgiveness is a primary object of apology.
It precedes apology's ultimate object: reconciliation .... [F]orgiveness is also an intra-psychic
phenomenon of cognitive restructuring that can occur independent of both an apology and the
victim's external manifestations of forgiveness.").
33. Outside the legal context, on the other hand, complete reconciliation may require
complete forgiveness. See Ervin Staub, Constructive Rather Than Harmful Forgiveness,
Reconciliation, and Ways to Promote Them after Genocide and Mass Killing, in HANDBOOK OF
FORGIVENESS, supra note 6, at 445 ("Forgiveness and reconciliation can both vary in degree.
The two processes seem intertwined. Some degree of forgiveness, of letting go of fear and anger,
may be required for reconciliation to begin.").
34. See MURPHY, supra note 19, at 14-15 (offering, as an example, the case of a battered
woman who forgives her aggressor but refuses to have any further contact with him).
[Vol. 42:5
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harm and must offer some expression of regret or remorse." The
causal association of apology with settlement and reconciliation is
well documented.36 In fact, apology is often a tort plaintiffs chief
aim, with legal action serving only as a backstop to the wrongdoer's
failure to apologize.37 Apology fulfills a number of the victim's
psychological needs, including "restoring self-respect and dignity,
assuring victims that the offense wasn't their fault, allowing victims
to feel secure that the offense won't happen again, validating the
victims' experience, and evening the score."38 Apology also allows
the victim to identify with the offender (because everyone has
experienced the pain of shame and remorse), which often creates a
bond between them.39  We have all experienced the "near
instantaneous erosion of anger and pain" that follows a wrongdoer's
sincere apology, an emotional reaction often quite unwanted and
35. Lee Taft, Apology Within a Moral Dialectic: A Reply to Professor Robbennolt, 103
MICH. L. REV. 1010, 1012 (2005) ("What elevates [apology] to a truly moral and corrective
communication is the offending party's willingness to accept the consequences that flow from the
wrongful act."). Taft argues that "the willingness to accept consequences [is] an act of moral
courage, which can inspire healing in both the party harmed as well as in the offender." Id. at
1012, n.14. See, e.g., O'Hara & Yam, supra note 32, at 1132. In some cases, an apology must
also include assurances that the wrongful conduct will not happen again. Id. at 1135.
36. See generally ELAZAR BARKAN & ALEXANDER KARN, TAKING WRONGS SERIOUSLY:
APOLOGIES AND RECONCILIATION (2006) (examining the role of apology as a social force);
AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY (2004) (analyzing the power of apology to restore broken
relationships); NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND
RECONCILIATION (1991) (exploring apologetic discourse as a means of resolving conflicts);
Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009 (1999) (arguing that
lawyers should discuss with their clients the possibility of apology more frequently); Suzy Fox &
Lamont E. Stallworth, How Effective Is an Apology in Resolving Workplace Bullying Disputes?,
61 DISP. RESOL. J. 54 (2006) (reporting results of an empirical study showing that apology
greatly increases the likelihood of quick and inexpensive resolution of workplace disputes);
Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An
Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107 (1994) (reporting empirical results in which
tenants were shown to be more likely to accept settlement offers from landlords when the offer
was accompanied by an apology); Elizabeth Latif, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies
Tailored Toward Legal Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV. 289 (2001) (arguing that apologies should be
incorporated into the resolution of legal disputes); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal
Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460 (2003) (reporting a positive
association between apology and settlement based on an empirical study of hypothetical
settlement offers); Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1165 (1997) (exploring the conditions under which apologies can be effective as a resolution to a
dispute).
37. E.g., O'Hara & Yam, supra note 32, at 1124; Shuman, supra note 23, at 180.
38. Brent White, Say You're Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights Remedy, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 1261, 1274 (2006).
39. Armour & Umbreit, supra note 6, at 497.
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outside our control.4" Apology also serves the wrongdoer by helping
to assuage guilt and restore self-image, and by opening the door to
social reacceptance. 4' Thus, by attending to the psychological needs
of both parties and by signaling a commitment to cooperation on the
part of the offender, apology lays the path for reconciliation.42
C. Communication Between the Parties
Because reconciliation is the restoration of a social equilibrium,
it is helpful for the parties to communicate directly with one
another. 43  Face-to-face interaction is not always necessary (e.g., an
exchange of letters might suffice), although such meetings have
proven to be an integral part of the restorative-justice movement in
criminal law.44 When wrongful acts and injury are tied to a voice and
a face, each party is more able to identify with the other, and
empathy is sometimes the result. 45  In the same sense,
communication facilitates understanding of the other party's
motivations and actions, another factor that paves the way for
reconciliation.46
D. Reparations
One of the most important preconditions to reconciliation is that
the offender make tangible reparations of the victim's injury.47 In the
40. O'Hara & Yam, supra note 32, at 1124.
41. Latif, supra note 36, at 292-95.
42. See O'Hara & Yam, supra note 32, at 1168.
43. See, e.g., Von J. Christiansen, Ritual and Resolution: The Role of Reconciliation in the
Mediation Process, 52 DISP. RESOL. J. 66, 71 (1997) (noting that the healing power of mediation
can only happen once the parties "face real human beings, not distant, demonified, exaggerated
constructs").
44. See Latif, supra note 36, at 292-93.
45. Cf Armour & Umbreit, supra note 6, at 497 ("Apology stimulates emotional dissonance
and humility, which allows victims to recognize their own transgressions and respond on the
basis of commonalities rather than differences.").
46. Cf id. at 498 ("[E]mpathy-based forgiveness results in more forgiveness than does non-
empathy-based forgiveness."); Ervin Staub et al., Healing Reconciliation, Forgiving and the
Prevention of Violence After Genocide or Mass Killing: An Intervention and Its Experimental
Evaluation in Rwanda, 24 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 297, 301 (2005) ("Understanding how
the other has become a perpetrator may facilitate acceptance, but may not by itself lead to
forgiving [and reconciliation]." (citation omitted)).
47. See O'Hara & Yam, supra note 32, at 1136 (arguing that an apology is only effective
with an offer of repair); see also Richard B. Bilder, The Role of Apology in International Law and
Diplomacy, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 433, 438 (2006) (listing elements for a genuine apology, which
include offering appropriate reparation); Shuman, supra note 23, at 185 (citing a Japanese study
[Vol. 42:5
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tort context, such reparations will typically consist of money
damages. Repair of the tort victim's injury is essential for two
primary reasons. First, psychologists have long evaluated
individuals' well-being according to a hierarchy of needs. For most
people, physical health and income48 -needs addressed by tort
damages-exist higher in the hierarchy than does the need for social
balance. 9 Thus, physical and financial repair must typically occur
before reconciliation may follow. Second, the offering of reparations
by the wrongdoer is a strong sign that apology, remorse, and the
desire to reconcile are real and not manufactured. Without
assurances that the offender is genuine, few victims are willing to
walk the path of reconciliation.
E. Acceptance of Apology and
Reparations by the Victim
Because reconciliation is a two-party endeavor, it often requires
not only apology and reparations, but also an acceptance of those
offerings by the tort victim." Acceptance, as it is conceived here, is
not synonymous with forgiveness. It is a purely social act. Although
some level of forgiveness might accompany acceptance, acceptance
might also occur without forgiveness. For example, the Boy Scout's
parents might have accepted the firing instructor's apology, his
remorse, and any reparations he offered, yet still may have needed
time to forgive his actions. Such acceptance is important nonetheless
because it is emblematic of the tort victim's desire to reconcile with
showing that negative emotions often did not resolve, even after apology, without accompanying
reparations).
48. The importance of income is solely as a precondition to food, clothing, and shelter.
49. See generally Abraham Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation (1943), reprinted in
MANAGEMENT AND MOTIVATION, 27-41 (V.H. Vroom et al. eds., 1970) (setting forth a theory of
hierarchy of needs).
50. See Christiansen, supra note 43, at 75 ("For healing to occur, however, ritual demands
that the conciliatory gesture of the offering party be recognized, and the attempts at restoration
accepted."); James R. A. Merrick, Justice, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation: The Reconciliatory
Cross as Forgiving Justice, 30 EVANGELICAL REV. OF THEOL. 292, 304 (2006) ("Ultimately,
however, reconciliation is a two-way street .... Those who scorn and reject forgiveness reject
not only the restoration of the relationship and their responsibility... but also the opportunity to
be transformed and reconciled."); O'Hara & Yam, supra note 32, at 1123 ("These desires to
apologize and to receive forgiveness are themselves important human emotions that can enable a
transgressor to overcome the conflicting emotions of shame and humiliation to press for
reconciliation.").
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the offender. The act also promotes healing on the part of the victim
by virtue of its altruism.5
F. Motivation
Finally, even with all other conditions fulfilled, parties will not
reconcile without sufficient motivation. Sometimes, the negative
emotions and the promise of their repair provide a sufficient stick
and carrot. Such negative emotions might also, however, work at
cross-purposes with the need to reconcile because the very anger or
shame that reconciliation is meant to cure may cause one to resist it.
Thus, in some cases, additional incentives toward reconciliation
prove useful. Furthermore, in the litigation context it is not only the
parties that are often in need of motivation, but also their attorneys."
The rather challenging topic of motivating both the parties and their
attorneys to seek mediation is addressed further in Part III below. 3
III. RECONCILIATION IN MEDIATION
Reconciliation among parties is one of the primary goals of
mediation. 4 In Texas, for example, where mediation is mandated by
statute, mediation is defined as "a forum in which an impartial
person, the mediator, facilitates communication between the parties
to promote reconciliation, settlement, or understanding among
them."55 The goal of reconciliation in mediation is typically more
51. See Lazare, supra note 36 at I ("One of the most profound human interactions is the...
accepting of apologies. Apologies have the power to heal humiliations and grudges ... ").
52. See Levi, supra note 36, at 1188 (noting that attorneys typically impose a "certain
rational calculation on every subsequent move," putting strategy and competition ahead of the
client's need for apology and reconciliation).
53. See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
54. See Deborah A. Schmedemann, Reconciling Differences: The Theory and Law of
Mediating Labor Grievances, 9 INDUS. REL. L.J. 523, 594 (1987) ("'Mediation tends to heal
wounds, not just pay for bandages.' Thus mediation holds promise as a means of reconciling-
not just patching over-differences among labor, management, and employees arising under labor
contracts."); James D. Yellen et al., Mediation Redux: Now More Than Ever Suggestions for
Practitioners, 1554 PLI/CoRP 325, 337 (2006) (citing a common sample "Rules for Mediation"
to explain that "[miediation is a process in which an impartial person, the mediator, facilitates
communication between the parties to promote reconciliation, settlement, or understanding
among them"). Reconciliation is also often the focus of international negotiation. See, e.g.,
Hilary K. Josephs, The Remedy of Apology in Comparative and International Law: Self-Healing
and Reconciliation, 18 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 53 (2004) (discussing the efficacy of apology in the
international and comparative context).
55. Robert K. Wise, Mediation in Texas: Can the Judge Really Make Me Do That?, 47 S.
TEX. L. REV. 849, 851 (2006) (citing the Texas ADR Act).
[Vol. 42:5
DAMA GES AS RECONCILIATION
comprehensive than the concept promoted in this Article because it
often encompasses a concern for the parties' future relationship. 6
Even with such ambition, however, mediators report frequent success
in achieving some level of reconciliation. 7
The rate at which cases are mediated rather than resolved in
court has increased dramatically in recent decades.58  Parties
sometimes mediate their disputes voluntarily, but increasingly, they
are compelled to do so by contract, court order, or statute.5 9 The
increased use of mediation stems largely from a desire to reduce the
burden of litigation on the court system.6" It also reflects both an
awareness that the litigation process leaves many participants
unsatisfied and a collective desire that people work out their disputes
in a more constructive fashion.6' In light of these general sentiments
and the express objectives of mediation, the increase in court-ordered
and statutorily required mediation suggests that reconciliation is
already more important to our legal system than an examination of
litigation alone might suggest.
The real question is why the two divergent paths. Why is
reconciliation central to mediation but irrelevant to litigation? One
answer is historical. America's adversarial litigation system was
inherited from England and embraced by our competition-driven
society.6" Interparty conflict resolution has never been a formal part
56. Dwight Golann, Is Legal Mediation Really a Repair Process? Or a Separation?, 19
ALTERNATIVES To HIGH COST LITIG. 171, 171 (2001) ("One of mediation's most valuable
qualities is its reputed ability to repair broken relationships-even to bring about emotional
reconciliation-between disputing parties.").
57. See id. at 186-87 (describing the results of an empirical study in which mediators
reported achieving some form of reconciliation in approximately 47 percent of cases).
58. Wise, supra note 55, at 849 ("The use of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") has
increased exponentially during the last thirty years."); see Linda R. Singer, SETTLING DISPUTES:
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN BUSINESS, FAMILIES, AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 165 (2d ed. 1994)
(describing an increase in mandatory mediation).
59. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 16-7-101 (1995); 735 I1. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-IOOIA
(2008); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7361 (2007).
60. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note (amended 2003), 7A U.L.A. 105 (Supp.
2005) ("Mediation fosters the early resolution of disputes ... [,] diminishes the unnecessary
expenditure of personal and institutional resources for conflict resolution, and promotes a more
civil society.").
61. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.002 (Vernon 2005) ("It is the
policy of this state to encourage the peaceable resolution of disputes ... and the early settlement
of pending litigation through voluntary settlement procedures.").
62. See generally Stephan A. Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary
System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713 (1983) (describing the history and development of the adversary
system).
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of such a system. Indeed, quite the opposite is true-it is conflict
that drives our litigation process.63 Mediation arose largely as a
reaction to the more caustic aspects of litigation, which include the
almost warlike mentality that litigation breeds among its
participants-a mentality not particularly conducive to
reconciliation. 64
Perhaps a more obvious explanation for the divergence stems
from the nature of the remedy offered by each approach. In court,
the remedy is a decision concerning liability determined by a third
party (a judge or jury), followed by a forced transfer of resources
from one party to another. In mediation, the remedy is a voluntary
agreement between the parties, unspoiled by the threat of
enforcement. Although the prospect of liability and forced transfer
often nudges litigating parties toward settlement, the mediation
process is much more amenable to the type of communication and
cooperation that leads to reconciliation.
Neither of these explanations, however, precludes reconciliation
from becoming a part of the litigation process-both indicate only
that reconciliation does not naturally arise in an adversarial system.
This Article does not take the position that mediation is preferable to
adversarial litigation, or that the two systems ought to merge, or even
that they ought to adopt the same ultimate goals. The Article does,
however, urge that courts can and should embrace reconciliation as
one of the law's central goals in litigation, particularly in tort cases.
The following section examines the viability of the adoption of
63. There is no Platonic reason that the law had to develop in this way. Feminists have
critiqued this aspect of the law as embodying an unduly male, rights-based approach to legal
issues. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829
(1990) (advocating alternatives to traditional "male" legal reasoning); Patricia W. Hatamyar &
Kevin M. Simmons, Are Women More Ethical Lawyers? An Empirical Study, 31 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 785, 845-46 (2004) (citing a study of women lawyers that found that "many interviewees
ascribed an 'ethic of competition' to the still male-dominated legal culture, especially in
litigation, where the adversarial system compels lawyers '[like football players or armed
warriors, . . . to compete with the serious aim of defeating the opposing side.' . . . [Whereas]
female attorneys subscribe more to an 'ethic of care' and 'tend to shy away from the most
adversarial arenas in the law and to gravitate toward those forms of practice that are most
consultative and conciliatory' . . . . ... (quoting MONA HARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS:
REWRITING THE RULES 10-11, 128-33, 129, 150 (1994))).
64. See Symposium, Teaching a New Paradigm: Must Knights Shed Their Swords and
Armor to Enter Certain ADR Arenas?, I CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 3 (2000)
("The parties are called opponents and the process is one that takes on the characteristics of a
battle. The sides frequently view themselves as warriors .... [T]here is still little expectation of
cooperation and collaboration when engaged in the adversarial arena termed the legal system.").
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reconciliation methods by courts and explores several possible
changes to the law's method of remediation in an effort to implement
such an approach.
IV. TORT DAMAGES AS RECONCILIATION
Because reconciliation has the potential to repair social injury,
its positive utility seems apparent. In the context of tort law,
however, one might legitimately question the degree to which
reconciliation can mix with existing instrumental and corrective
justice goals. Taking the latter first, reconciliation seems to be fairly
consistent with an Aristotelian account of corrective justice.
Aristotle believed that the purpose of the law is to "correct" wrongs
by restoring the pre-wrong equilibrium between wrongdoer and
victim.65 Reconciliation serves this corrective purpose to the extent
that it restores the pre-tort social balance between parties. Indeed,
one might argue that thus understood, corrective justice remains
incomplete without some measure of reconciliation between the
parties.
Similar reasoning might apply to modem expressions of
Aristotle's basic premise. If one views tort law as a means of legal
enforcement of a moral obligation to repair a wrongfully inflicted
loss,66 it does not seem too extravagant to suggest that a wrongdoer's
moral obligation of repair includes an obligation to right a social
wrong in addition to any physical, emotional, or financial wrongs.
(After all, it is our common fourth-grade-playground moral
obligation to apologize and make up after one has bounced another
from the teeter-totter.) Pursuant to the most recent spin-off of
corrective justice, known as civil recourse theory, tort law is seen as
a means of empowering wronged parties to seek redress.67 Primarily
a descriptive theory, civil recourse does not address the proper scope
of redress, but rather implies that redress is defined by the courts
over time.68 Thus, it seems that a civil recourse theorist might
65. See WEINRIB, supra note 21.
66. See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 577.
67. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 739
(2003) ("[T]he very question of whether the defendant will be held liable is a question of whether
the plaintiff is genuinely entitled to an avenue of recourse-to an action-against the
defendant.").
68. Id. at 700.
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concede that courts may choose to give plaintiffs standing to seek
redress for the social harm that reconciliation helps to repair.
An exhaustive analysis of reconciliation's fit with the many
instrumentalist goals of tort law69 is quite beyond the scope of this
Article. Reconciliation likely serves many instrumentalist ends,
however. In addition to helping to make tort victims whole, a tort
system that embraces reconciliation might generate lower transaction
costs than traditional litigation, reduce the possibility of further legal
strife between the parties, and better deter future tortious behavior.
This last point has been studied in the context of apology, a
precondition to reconciliation." In the criminal and corporate
contexts, for example, court-ordered apology has been shown to
promote specific deterrence by shaming the offender and by
harnessing the psychological phenomenon known as cognitive
dissonance.7' Court-ordered apology has also been shown to
promote general deterrence by reinforcing social norms.72 Similar
results have been found in the context of forgiveness (another
concept related to reconciliation), the theory being that receiving
forgiveness "may motivate offenders to reciprocate goodwill through
improved behavior and reparations."73 If such findings are accurate,
then one would expect to see similar results in the context of
reconciliation.74
69. See King, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
70. See generally White, supra note 38, at 1287 (explaining that cognitive dissonance
maintains that each of us has a psychological need for our beliefs, feelings, and actions to be
consistent and that if these cognitions are inconsistent, one experiences psychological pain and is
motivated to return to consonance). In the context of apology, the theory is that "being compelled
to apologize for wrongdoing without feeling sorry could be a first step in cognitively
acknowledging wrongdoing and in adjusting one's future actions and attitudes to conform to this
new belief." Id. at 1288.
71. Id. at 1288.
72. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 593
(1996); Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for
Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 367-68 (1999); David A.
Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1814-17 (2001).
73. Exline et al., supra note 31, at 340. Exline et al. cite a study by Kelln and Ellard that
showed that participants who received forgiveness were more likely to comply with future related
behavioral demands than those who received retribution. See id. at 340. Exline et al. also
suggest, however, that a number of variables might cause forgiveness to backfire in some cases.
See id. at 341.
74. See O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 32, at 1136 (asserting that apology and reconciliation
may "increase the likelihood that the transgressor will reform her behavior").
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Even if reconciliation rests easily with other common goals of
tort law, a number of practical objections must be considered. First,
one might argue that the law is poorly suited to tinker with the
opaque workings of private, interpersonal relationships. This is a
real concern, as the law has often proven unsuccessful in such
undertakings.75 Imposing reconciliation on parties to a tort suit might
even violate constitutional privacy and First Amendment norms.
This Article does not, however, advocate forced reconciliation (were
such a thing even possible). Rather, it urges courts to cultivate the
conditions pursuant to which parties might themselves choose to
reconcile or at the very least to mitigate the aspects of litigation that
hinder the efforts by parties toward reconciliation.
Nonetheless, it is possible that any move toward state-
encouraged reconciliation might backfire. Reconciliation is a
delicate animal, its success dependent in some measure on the
spontaneous altruism of the parties involved. If courts meddle too
deeply, they may quell spontaneity, and the parties may re-entrench.
Even a person predisposed to reconciliation might withdraw if
pushed to reconcile. Similarly, state-facilitated reconciliation might
in some cases be hollow and leave parties with more, not less,
disutility. There is some evidence-again, primarily in the context
of apology and forgiveness-that state-enforced altruism suffers
from three faults: (1) it is ineffective because it is not sincere;76 (2) it
undermines the moral value of genuine altruism;77 and (3) it can, in
some circumstances, harm victims by exacerbating their negative
emotions and feelings of self-worth,78 by interfering with their own
75. One example that comes to mind is where the law has sought to discourage divorce. See
e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 584 (1932) (barring prenuptial agreements or other
contracts made in contemplation of divorce for public policy reasons). One wonders how many
unhappy, not to mention abusive, relationships have been prolonged by such laws.
76. E.g., White, supra note 38, at 1293 ("Many legal scholars have argued against compelled
apologies in criminal cases and against strategic apologies in civil cases by asserting that an
insincere apology is worthless.").
77. See Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J.
1135, 1147 (2000) (arguing that court-ordered apology loses its moral dimension because it is
"not prompted by remorse, but rather by the incentive offered by the court to reduce the penalty
imposed").
78. See, e.g., Armour & Umbreit, supra note 6, at 493 ("[Flor many individual victims,
terms such as forgiveness and reconciliation are interpreted as devaluing their criminal
victimization or as judging their legitimate anger and rage as inappropriate .... [T]he more one
talks about these concepts, the more likely they will be heard as behavioral prescriptions, and the
less likely victims will participate and have the opportunity to experience elements of forgiveness
and reconciliation."). See generally Cardi et al., supra, note 31 (presenting a study in which
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moral compass, and even by increasing the likelihood that they will
be re-victimized in the future.79 It is important to keep each of these
concerns in mind when considering the manner in which courts
encourage reconciliation.
The following paragraphs offer several ways that courts might
make reconciliation a part of the litigation landscape. The first is to
recognize explicitly a separate category of damages for social harm.
This recognition serves three purposes. First, it puts the norm-
enhancing imprimatur of the state on the importance of social
reparation.8" Second, in the absence of specific repair of social harm
(via reconciliation), damages provide a second-best means of making
the victim whole. And third, the potential for a separate cache of
damages would create specific leverage for tort victims to use in
bargaining for apology and efforts toward reconciliation. The
recognition of such damages would of course meet strong objections,
including concerns regarding potential double recovery and the
amorphous nature of social harm. Tort law has found doctrinal ways
to address these concerns in the context of recovery for emotional
harm, however.8 Social harm would not present a qualitatively
different challenge.
A second possibility is to create a formal mechanism by which a
losing tort defendant has the option to offer an apology in return for a
reduction in damages. It is important to condition such remittitur on
the plaintiffs assessment of the apology's value and the plaintiffs
willingness to accept the exchange. One potential criticism of such a
mechanism is that it adds little to what the parties might otherwise
bargain for in settlement negotiations. What it adds, however, is the
law's endorsement of such a bargain and a formal mechanism
victims with high self-esteem displayed more negative affect when counseled to forgive their
perpetrators).
79. See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 19, at 80 (questioning the wisdom of counseling victims
to forgive their transgressors because it might make them more likely to remain victims); Armour
& Umbreit, supra note 6, at 497 ("Coerced apologies that are perceived as lacking authenticity
raise concerns about re-victimization. It can also turn a potentially healing process into
something mechanical and offensive. Because even weak or indirect apologies influence the
willingness to forgive, it is important to recognize strong social norms that encourage victims to
accept an apology, regardless of its strength." (citations omitted)).
80. Cf White, supra note 38, at 1281 ("Compelled apologies not only have the power to
reinforce moral and legal norms, they could also transform those norms.").
81. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Removing Emotional Harm from the Core of Tort Law, 54
VAND. L. REv. 751, 751-52 (describing causes of action for negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
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pursuant to which parties might feel more comfortable in reaching an
agreement. This proposal is also subject to the criticism leveled
against court-ordered apologies-that it runs the risk of encouraging
insincerity and pressuring otherwise unwilling victims to forgive.82
Although these concerns should not be taken lightly, there is
substantial evidence that "plaintiffs accept negotiated apologies as
valuable and treasured parts of settlements, even when they know
that the apology is insincere." 3  As Dan Shuman explains,
"compelling even an insincere apology and forgiveness reinforces an
important social ritual and encourages wrongdoers to take
responsibility for their actions; moreover, accepting an apology, even
ritualistically, encourages victims to learn to forgive
Furthermore, courts already compel or reward apologies in certain
contexts.85 Some states also seek to facilitate apologies by denying
their admissibility as evidence of a defendant's fault.86 Again,
however, the purpose of this proposal is not to compel apology or the
victim's acceptance of an apology, but merely to supply a forum and
an additional incentive for reconciliation. The ultimate choice
remains with the parties.
A third proposal is that in ordering the payment of tort damages,
courts ought to use their equitable powers to compel delivery of
payment directly from the tortfeasor to the victim. Such orders
would, of course, be conditioned upon feasibility and the victim's
willingness. Also, in order to guard against the potential for further
confrontation, delivery might be accompanied by an officer of the
82. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
83. White, supra note 38, at 1296.
84. Shuman, supra note 23, at 187.
85. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas & Richard A Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology
into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 93 (2004) (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 3El1 cmt. n.3 (2003), which authorizes judges to consider a defendant's acceptance
of responsibility when issuing sentences); Latif, supra note 36, at 296-98 (offering a number of
examples of court-ordered apology); White, supra note 38, at 1269 (urging court-ordered
apologies in civil rights cases and citing other scholarship urging the same in other civil contexts).
86. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135(1) (2003) (protecting apologies of health-care
providers from being admissible as statements against interest in civil actions or arbitration
proceedings brought by an alleged victim of an unanticipated outcome of medical care); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-1708.1H (West 2004) (protecting apologies of certain health-care
providers from being admissible as statements against interest in medical malpractice cases); OR.
REV. STAT. § 677.082(1) (2003) (protecting apologies of any person licensed by the Oregon
Medical Board from being considered admissions of liability for any purpose); see also Shuman,
supra note 23, at 188 (discussing a Massachusetts statute that shields defendants from having
their apologies used against them and incentivizes apologies to mitigate harm).
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court. The purpose of compelled in-person compensation is twofold.
First, it makes more immediate the reality that the victim is being
compensated by the wrongdoer. Compared to compensation by
check or wire transfer, the victim might feel greater satisfaction that
the social imbalance has been righted, and the wrongdoer might feel
a more palpable release that she has fulfilled her obligation of repair.
Second, the direct contact between parties in the context of ritualistic
reparation might provide an opportunity for more substantial steps
toward reconciliation.
Courts might also take steps to encourage reconciliation that are
not connected to the remedial process. Judges might, for example,
expressly endorse the possibility of reconciliation upon the filing of a
complaint and just before the commencement of trial proceedings.
Courts might also encourage or even require meetings between the
parties without their attorneys but in the presence of a court-
appointed mediator. Finally, in an even more radical move, courts
might offer parties the option of having their dispute mediated, rather
than tried by a jury.
V. CONCLUSION
This modest Article is meant to begin a discussion about the
value of reconciliation in tort cases and the means by which tort
remedies might encourage reconciliation. In light of the hazards
involved when seeking to influence interpersonal relations, steps in
this direction must be taken deliberately and with the benefit of
continual study. Although a systematic overhaul of the tort system
thus seems unlikely (and unwise), for courts to embrace
reconciliation as an important consideration in tort cases is both
possible and desirable.
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